North Korea Surprise Attack :: essays research papers

In 1949, Congress dragged its feet in considering a $150 million one dollar bill aid bill to South Korea. Syngman Rhee had so often talked about invading wedlock Korea that US leaders feared giving him too much in the fashion of weapons. For this reason, South Korea was sent only rifles, bazookas, and light artillery tanks an airplanes were held back. Also by 1949, most of the US military had moved out. Only 500 advisors, known as KMAG (the Korean Military Advisory Group) remained in South Korea, under the command of Brigadier-General William L. Roberts. In January of 1950, the House defeated the Korean Aid Bill by a single vote Korea was scheduled no to get American Aid for the following year, 1950. On June 25, 1950 the North Korean army attacked South Korea, crossing the thirty-eighth Parallel. Pentagon officials were stunned, and had no immediate contingency plan ready. Some said little could be done, while others suggested it was the beginning of Stalins plot to take over the world. Truman and his circle of advisers sit firmly in this latter group. Immediately upon the invasion, these advisors discussed the prospect of sending General Douglas MacArthur, the US commander in the Far East, to lead a military response. The North Korean invaders hoped to take Seoul, the South Korean capital, as quickly as possible. The majority of ROK forces were routed by North Korean troops. Only one ROK division, the 6th, held its ground. John Muccio, the American ambassador to South Korea, quickly reported back to Washington that a "probable" full-scale attack was under way. Meanwhile, Syngman Rhee reacted to news of the invasion by ordinance the imprisonment of more South Koreans. The UN was particularly upset about the North Korean invasion, because it had overseen the elections held in 1948, and did not want to see a war untie that election.